Looks Like Europe Needs My Help Again

Summary

• The state of war in Ukraine could marker a watershed for European security.
• At that place has been much talk that European governments are divided over the conflict, but European citizens seem remarkably united effectually three key ideas.
• Firstly, they believe information technology is likely that there will be another Russian invasion of Ukraine.
• Secondly, they see this as a problem not only for Ukraine but for European security generally.
• Thirdly, they want Europe to respond to the crunch, with majorities supporting a response from NATO and the EU in particular.
• Europeans disagree on which are the nigh pressing threats linked to the crunch and on the price their countries should pay to defend Ukraine: people in Poland, Romania, and Sweden are much more willing to make sacrifices than those in France and Germany.
• The crisis will likely test Europeans' readiness to defend the European security order.

Introduction

The Russia-Ukraine crisis could dramatically change the manner Europeans remember about their security. There is widespread speculation about whether Russian federation volition invade Ukraine once again – and, if it does so, how Europeans will react.

Much of the public debate on the crisis has portrayed European governments as divided, weak, and absent. However, a pan-European poll conducted by the European Council on Strange Relations in late January 2022 shows that in that location is a surprising consensus on the crisis among European voters. Europeans in the north, due south, east, and west agree that Russia is likely to invade Ukraine in 2022, that European countries have a duty to defend Ukraine, and that this is a European problem.

The survey covers Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Romania, and Sweden – countries that together business relationship for almost two-thirds of the European Union's population. It shows that Russian President Vladimir Putin has succeeded in putting the question of the European security order on the table. To the surprise of many commentators – and likely Putin himself – this has prompted a geopolitical awakening among Europeans. The results of the survey betoken to four fundamental observations: that war in Europe is no longer unthinkable; that we should respond to Russian aggression; that Europeans' biggest fears related to the crunch differ from country to country; and that European governments need to plan for various contingencies to ease the burden on ordinary citizens.

War in Europe is no longer unthinkable

At the beginning of the covid-19 pandemic, some European governments framed the fight against the virus equally a war. Now, fear of a existent war is stalking Europe. There is no longer much truth in the cliché that Europeans believe war is unthinkable and take peace for granted. Every bit ECFR's new poll reveals, they perceive their world equally existence in a pre-state of war rather than post-war land. In every surveyed country apart from Finland, most respondents believe information technology likely that Russia will invade Ukraine again in 2022.

It is clear that, unlike in 2014, Europeans view the disharmonize in Ukraine as a European crisis. Seventy-three per cent of respondents in Poland see an invasion as probable. The same is true of 64 per cent in Romania, 55 per cent in Sweden, 52 per cent in Frg, 51 per cent in France and Italian republic, and a plurality of 44 per cent in Republic of finland. It seems that existence neutral might have the fear out of war machine disharmonize.

In Poland, for reasons of history and geography, respondents come across the prospect of a Russian invasion equally an existential crisis. Poles in all age groups demand to reckon with an escalation in the Russia-Ukraine war. In the other surveyed countries, there is an interesting generational divide. In France and Sweden, people over the historic period of 60 are more inclined to see an invasion as very probable. In Romania, Italy, Germany, and Republic of finland, it is the youngest generation – people born afterwards the end of the common cold state of war – who are most worried.

Putin has succeeded in his try to grab Europe'due south attention, just this has come at a price. Equally ECFR's new survey demonstrates, more than than half of Europeans agree that Russian federation's approach to Ukraine represents a security threat to Europe every bit a whole in a multifariousness of domains.

Ukraine matters, but national responses are non enough by themselves

As shown by a poll ECFR conducted belatedly concluding year, until recently, nearly Europeans thought that any future 'common cold war' would be a confrontation between the United States and Russia or China. Europeans would be spectators rather than participants in this disharmonize. Indeed, when the Russian troop build-up on Ukraine's border began, there was a lot of speculation in the media that Europeans would not really care most the crunch.

ECFR's latest survey reveals that this assumption was wrong. It is probably truthful that more than Europeans nonetheless view Ukraine as large and chaotic than as small and heroic. Notwithstanding, nearly of them agree that Ukraine should be defended. The question is: who should step up?

In almost all surveyed countries, near respondents run into NATO as the organisation best positioned to defend Ukraine. Remarkably, the exception is Poland, where slightly more than people see the European union in this role.

Information technology may be unsurprising that the threat of Russian invasion has revived the West of the cold war era. But, intriguingly, it has also challenged the popular perception that, when it comes to security, eastern Europeans are prepare to dismiss the European union because they view the US equally their only reliable partner. In fact, in all surveyed countries except Germany, most people believe that both NATO and the Eu should answer to Russian assailment.

It is truthful that Europeans differ on whom they trust to protect their interests in the event of some other Russian invasion of Ukraine. Respondents in Poland, Germany, Romania, and Italia primarily trust NATO to do so, whereas those in France, Sweden, and Finland generally trust the European union. Sweden and Finland are the only surveyed countries outside NATO but, equally ECFR'southward poll shows, in neither state is in that location a public consensus on whether to join the alliance. In Sweden, 30 per cent of respondents are glad that their country is not a member of NATO and 33 per cent say information technology is a bad thing; in Finland, these figures are 35 per cent and 25 per cent per cent respectively.

But the EU is not actually divided in the Manichean way that many assume – between those who trust NATO and those who trust the Eu. More 60 per cent of Poles, Romanians, and Italians trust the EU to protect European union citizens' interests if Russian federation invades Ukraine. Similarly, most Swedes and Finns trust NATO on that front, non just the EU.

At the same time, French and German respondents have the to the lowest degree trust of all national groupings in the European union'due south capacity to protect its citizens.

While most Europeans believe that Ukraine should be defended, there are major differences betwixt them near how to do it. While 65 per cent of Poles believe Poland should come to Ukraine's defense, the prevailing view among respondents in Republic of finland, Italian republic, and Deutschland is that their own countries should non practise then.

But, even in Poland, more respondents see the main defenders of Ukraine equally being the Eu (80 per cent) and NATO (79 per cent) than see their own land in this way. This could indicate that, for near Europeans, defending Ukraine means defending the post-cold war European security order rather than simply taking a side in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Therefore, they expect both NATO and the European union to act.

The poll also makes articulate that, while nearly Europeans nevertheless trust NATO to defend Europe, "NATO" is no longer just another proper name for "the U.s.". Europeans trust NATO to protect their interests more than they trust the The states to do so. This may reflect the fact that they increasingly view the U.s. as only a part-time European power, as these authors observed in a previous ECFR newspaper. In all surveyed countries bated from Poland and Romania, more respondents believe that Germany is in a improve position than the United states to protect EU citizens' interests if Russia invades Ukraine again.

ECFR's survey too proves that Brexit means Brexit. London's much-publicised show of solidarity with Kyiv notwithstanding, very few citizens anywhere in Europe see much of a role for the United Kingdom. Only in Poland (66 per cent) and Sweden (52 per cent) do about respondents remember that the UK should come to Ukraine's defence.

The political differences inside surveyed countries may exist even more hit than those between them.

In Frg, contrary to stereotypes, information technology is supporters of the eye-left parties in government rather than the Christian Democratic Marriage (CDU) who express the most willingness to defend Ukraine. Most current supporters of the greens and a plurality of Social Democratic Party voters desire Federal republic of germany to defend Ukraine. Amongst those who vote for the CDU, marginally more respondents do not want Germany to defend Ukraine than desire it to exercise and then.

In French republic, supporters of President Emmanuel Macron and his centre-right challenger, Valérie Pécresse, desire France to defend Ukraine. But – unlike in Federal republic of germany, where most people who vote for the largest far-correct party (Alternative for Germany) do not desire their country to do so – supporters of nationalist leaders Marine Le Pen and Eric Zemmour are divided on this issue.

This is also the case for supporters of all the major parties in Italia – which is widely perceived equally one of the EU member states most sympathetic to Russia. Those who vote for the Democratic Party are the most eager (55 per cent) to run into their country come to Ukraine's defence – but xl per cent of the party's supporters have the opposite stance. Similarly, while 54 per cent of those who vote for the far-right Brothers of Italy say that their country should not defend Ukraine, 37 per cent say that it should. Interestingly, supporters of Matteo Salvini'southward far-right League are similarly split on this issue.

In Poland, a large majority of supporters of all parties want Poland to defend Ukraine. Even so, when asked whom they trust to protect the interests of Eu citizens in the event of a Russian invasion of Ukraine, supporters of the ruling Police force and Justice party are the but grouping in which nigh people trust the Polish authorities to do and so – in a reflection of the country's political polarisation.

Same conflict, unlike fears

"Think what the Kremlin did to yous final time" is the phrase that all-time sums up Europeans' fears virtually a conflict betwixt the West and Russia. This holds true for their biggest security concerns about the prospect of some other Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Respondents in Poland are well-nigh worried non just near Russian armed forces action against their own land but, equally, about the ways in which the conflict could cause Ukrainians to abscond Ukraine – a business concern probable heightened by the migration crunch on the border between Poland and Belarus. Germans, Finns, Romanians, and Italians primarily fearfulness that Russian federation will cut off their energy supply. (For Romanians, an equally important threat concerns an economical downturn, probably reflecting the country'due south historically unstable economic state of affairs.) Meanwhile, French and Swedish citizens are virtually worried nigh cyber-attacks – probably due to Moscow'south recent attempts to interfere in their elections.

And then, there are national differences on these key issues. But, overall, Europeans see energy dependency as their most significant shared challenge in dealing with Russia: majorities in all surveyed countries apart from Sweden (47 per cent) say that this poses a major threat.

What toll will Europeans pay to defend Ukraine?

Europeans now know war in Europe is possible, but are they prepared for this kind of state of war? Today, geopolitical force is determined not just by military and economic power but also by the capacity to endure pain. Unlike during the common cold state of war, the opponent is not someone backside an iron drapery but someone from whom you purchase gas and to whom you consign high-tech goods. This makes them not merely potentially open to the European union's values and messages, simply also vulnerable to European economical pressure. While these connections are pathways for European soft ability, they could besides examination the Eu's resilience.

The West'south strategy for deterring Russia from launching another invasion of Ukraine is to make such an intervention more plush for the Russians. This involves a mixture of military machine deterrence in eastern Europe, arms shipments intended to bolster the Ukrainian military, and planning for a series of sanctions in diverse domains. The success of any strategy centred on sanctions will depend on Europeans' willingness to make economic sacrifices.

However, Poland, Sweden, and Romania are the but surveyed countries in which respondents who are willing to bear all the main burdens of defending Ukraine (including the threat of Russian military action) outnumber those who are not. Most worryingly, French and German citizens are among the least willing to bear these burdens, suggesting that they believe the risks of doing so outweigh the rewards.

Only in Poland are most respondents willing to accept the risks of an economic downturn, higher energy prices, cyber-attacks, a refugee crisis, and Russian military machine aggression to defend Ukraine. In Deutschland, France, Italian republic, and Finland, pluralities of respondents think that it is not worth doing so if this would chance an economical downturn. They mainly seem to back up sanctions that volition hurt Russia but will not hurt them.

The survey information also reveal a generational divide. At that place are interesting differences in the perceptions of the oldest and the youngest generations in eastern and western EU member states.

The results of the survey in Finland announced to reinforce stereotypes almost 'generation snowflake'. Although young Finns are relatively likely to believe that a war is looming, they are less willing than those over the age of lx for their country to defend Ukraine if this would risk an economic downturn, college energy prices, a refugee crisis, cyber-attacks, or Russian military action.

Like trends are axiomatic in Poland. In that location, although older people are equally likely every bit the young (73 per cent) to think that the threat of Russian military action against Ukraine is real, they are more likely to believe that it is worth taking all these risks to defend Ukraine.

Yet the generational divide is very dissimilar in other surveyed countries, particularly France and Deutschland – where younger people are more willing to make sacrifices than older ones in all areas. Surprisingly, in French republic, young respondents are much more willing than their older counterparts to endure the risk of Russian military machine action to defend Ukraine.

Conclusion

If Putin threatened Ukraine to forcefulness Europeans to think about the viability of the European security order, he has succeeded. But, judging by the results of ECFR's newest poll, the Russian president might be surprised that most Europeans seem ready to defend Ukraine.

These authors' estimation of the survey results is that Europeans would encounter another Russian invasion of Ukraine every bit an attack not just on a neighbouring country just on the European security order itself. And information technology is striking that so many respondents – in the n, south, east, and due west – call back this gild should be protected.

What will probably not surprise the Russian president is that, while Europeans are ready to stand backside Ukraine, they are less enthusiastic about paying the financial costs of deterring Russia.

The next few weeks volition test whether Europeans tin can make the transition from a world shaped by soft power to one shaped by resilience. The manner in which they deal with this test will be pivotal to the time to come of European security.

Methodology

This report is based on a public opinion poll that Datapraxis, AnalitiQs, and Dynata carried out for the European Council on Foreign Relations in Finland, France, Germany, Italian republic, Poland, Romania, and Sweden. The survey was conducted in the last 10 days of January 2022, with an overall sample of 5,529 respondents.

This was an online survey in Republic of finland (due north = 500), France (n = 1,000), Deutschland (n = i,000), Italian republic (north = 1,014), Poland (n = 1,015), Romania (n = 500) and Sweden (due north = 500). The results are nationally representative of basic demographics and past votes in each land. The full general margin of mistake is ±3 per cent for a sample of 1,000 and ±4 per cent for a sample of 500.

The exact dates of polling were: Finland (21-29 January), France (21-28 January), Germany (21-30 January), Italy (21-28 January), Poland (21-28 January), Romania (21-28 January), and Sweden (21-28 January).

Acknowledgments

The authors would especially like to thank Lucie Haupenthal once more for her inspirational back up in the writing and inquiry of this policy brief under extreme fourth dimension pressure. They would as well like to thank Pawel Zerka and Gosia Piaskowska, who spotted some of the most interesting trends and carried out painstaking work on the data that underpin this report, too as Marlene Riedel and Chris Eichberger, who worked on visualising the data. Susi Dennison made sensitive and useful suggestions on the substance. Chris Raggett has been an admirable editor. Andreas Bock led on strategic media outreach, actively supported by Katharina Egle, and Juan Ruitiña supported united states of america in launching this study so speedily after we received the data. The authors would also like to thank Paul Hilder and his squad at Datapraxis for their patient collaboration with us in developing and analysing the polling referred to in the study. Despite these many and varied contributions, whatever mistakes remain the authors' ain.

Nearly the authors

Ivan Krastev is chair of the Eye for Liberal Strategies, Sofia, and a permanent fellow at the Establish for Man Sciences in Vienna. He is author ofIs It Tomorrow Yet?: Paradoxes of the Pandemic, amidst many other publications.

Mark Leonard is co-founder and director of the European Council on Foreign Relations. He is the author ofWhy Europe Will Run the 21st Century andWhat Does China Call up?. His new book,The Historic period of Unpeace: How Connectivity Causes Conflict, was published on 2 September 2021.He also presents ECFR's weekly 'Earth in 30 Minutes' podcast.

The European Quango on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only stand for the views of its individual authors.

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Source: https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-crisis-of-european-security-what-europeans-think-about-the-war-in-ukraine/

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